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El supuesto fundamental de la justificación de la deducción basada en la teoría 
de la demostración al que se adhieren Dummett y Prawitz consiste en que “si tenemos 
un argumento válido para un enunciado complejo, podemos construir para él un ar-
gumento válido que termina con una aplicación de una de las reglas de introducción 
que gobieran su operador principal”. Defiendo aquí que este supuesto, en su versión 
general, es defectuoso y que debería restringirse de manera que no se aplique a argu-
mentos en general, sino sólo a demostraciones. Argumento también que el proyecto 
de Dummett y Prawitz de proporcionar una base lógica para la metafísica descansa só-
lo en el argumento restringido. 
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Prawitz, teorías verificacionistas del significado, realismo versus antirrealismo.  
 
ABSTRACT 
The fundamental assumption of Dummett’s and Prawitz’ proof-theoretic justifi-
cation of deduction is that ‘if we have a valid argument for a complex statement, we 
can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the 
introduction rules governing its principal operator’. I argue that the assumption is 
flawed in this general version, but should be restricted, not to apply to arguments in 
general, but only to proofs. I also argue that Dummett’s and Prawitz’ project of pro-
viding a logical basis for metaphysics only relies on the restricted assumption. 
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The fundamental assumption of Dummett’s and Prawitz’ proof-
theoretic justification of deduction has largely been ignored in the literature, 
even though Dummett and Prawitz assign great importance to it. It originates 
in Dummett’s The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (henceforth LBM). As the 
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name indicates, Dummett places it at the foundations of the proof-theoretic 
justification of deduction. Prawitz agrees that it is of central importance to 
their project, where the meanings of sentences are specified by what count as 
their direct verifications, so that the meanings of logical constants are speci-
fied in terms of their use in arguments: if the fundamental assumption fails, 
‘it probably means a failure also of verificationism’ [Prawitz (1994), p. 375] 
and ‘it is the whole verificationist project that is in danger when the funda-
mental assumption cannot be upheld’ [Prawitz (2006), p. 523)]. Thus either a 
viable justification of the practice of ignoring the fundamental assumption is 
mandatory or a revision is called for. The aim of this paper is to justify the 
practice by arguing that the fundamental assumption should be dropped, as it 
is flawed. However, I shall argue that this is not a disaster for the proof-
theoretic justification of deduction, as the assumption need not be made. As it 
is hardly ever discussed in the literature, workers in the field seem to agree 
implicitly with my result, so it is worth making it explicit. 
I shall first give some background and introduce the fundamental as-
sumption together with the notions of direct and indirect verifications, compo-
sitionality and the complexity condition. I’ll then give four objections to the 
fundamental assumption. They are not all wholly original. Some of them can be 
found in Dummett’s writings, whose own examination leaves the fundamental 
assumption ‘very shaky’ [LBM p. 277]. Next I’ll observe that Dummett and 
Prawitz make very little use of the assumption in the development of their the-
ory. In particular, it is not used in formulating the notion of harmony and an 
argument against classical logic can be given solely on the basis of composi-
tionality and the complexity condition. I conclude that the assumption is un-
necessary to establish the main conclusions of Dummett’s and Prawitz’ 
programme. Finally, I shall argue that this does not matter for Dummett’s and 
Prawitz’ larger project of providing a logical basis for metaphysics: for this, 
only purely logical reasoning needs to be taken into account. Restricted to 
this realm, something very similar in content to the fundamental assumption 
reappears as a theorem on the forms of proofs in systems of natural deduc-
tion, i.e. as a consequence, not a prerequisite, of the proof-theoretic justifica-
tion of deduction. 
 
 
II. DUMMETT’S FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION 
 
According to Dummett, sentences have direct or canonical as well as 
indirect verifications. To illustrate, suppose Brutus desires a fig and Porcia 
knows that he does and Brutus knows that Porcia knows this: then, if Porcia 
offers to Brutus what he desires, Brutus can either verify directly that Porcia 
offers him a fig by waiting and seeing what she has for him, or he can verify 
this indirectly by deducing from his knowledge what Porcia offers him.  
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Direct verifications are linked to core uses of the expressions occurring 
in the sentence, whereas indirect verifications are further removed from them. 
‘[Indirect verifications] will include deductive arguments involving sentences 
of an unbounded degree of complexity. It is this that requires us to distinguish 
between direct and indirect verifications of a statement, or, in mathematics, be-
tween canonical proofs and demonstrations of a more general kind. A direct 
verification of a statement is one which proceeds in accordance with the com-
position of the sentence by means of which it is expressed [...] When direct 
verification involves deductive reasoning, this reasoning must always proceed 
from less complex premises to a more complex conclusion’ [LBM p. 229]. 
Indirect verifications of sentences have to be shown to be valid relative 
to direct ones: for any indirect verification, there must be a direct one. If this 
is not the case, it interferes with the partial ordering that dependence of mean-
ing imposes on the language, as then the indirect verification licenses a use of 
the sentence not in accordance with its place in the ordering. Dependence of 
meaning is a relation Dummett takes to hold between sets of expressions 
based on the observation that ‘the understanding of a word consists in the 
ability to understand characteristic members of a particular range of sen-
tences containing that word’ [LBM p. 225]. This leads to the principle of 
compositionality, which ‘requires that the relation of dependence between [sets 
of] expressions and [sets of] sentence-forms be asymmetric’ [LBM p. 223]. The 
qualification ‘sets of’ is needed because there may be collections of expres-
sions that can only be learned simultaneously — Dummett mentions simple 
colour words like ‘yellow’, ‘red’, ‘green’, ‘blue’. These however must form 
surveyable sets. Dependence of meaning has to have an end somewhere and 
can neither proceed ad infinitum nor in a circle. A compositional meaning-
theory employs the relation of dependence to impose a partial ordering on the 
expressions of the language, which exhibits how the language is learnable 
step by step.  
It is not easy to give a precise general characterisation of the distinction 
between direct and indirect verifications. But some such distinction is cer-
tainly motivated by compositionality. We may grant at least the following: 
even though there may not be obvious positive criteria for what counts as a 
direct verification of a sentence, there are reasonable and workable negative 
criteria for when something does not. We can agree with Dummett that a very 
elaborate argument for a very simple sentence, for instance, counts as an indi-
rect verification, even though we may not be so sure what its direct verifica-
tion is. ‘A Case of Identity’ in The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes contains a 
good example. I’m not sure what counts as a direct verification of the claim 
‘Mr Hosmer Angel is Mr James Windibank in disguise’, but Holmes’ later 
explanation to Watson surely does not: ‘“Well, of course it was obvious from 
the first that this Mr. Hosmer Angel must have some strong object for his cu-
rious conduct [of proposing to Windibank’s step-daughter, exacting vows of 
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fidelity from her, come what may, and disappearing the morning of the wed-
ding after having alluded that something might happen to him], and it was 
equally clear that the only man who really profited by the incident, as far as 
we could see, was the stepfather. Then the fact that the two men were never 
together, but that the one always appeared when the other was away, was 
suggestive. So were the tinted spectacles and the curious voice, which both 
hinted at a disguise, as did the bushy whiskers. My suspicions were all con-
firmed by his peculiar action in typewriting his signature, which, of course, 
inferred that his handwriting was so familiar to her that she would recognise 
even the smallest sample of it. You see, all these isolated facts, together with 
many minor ones, all pointed in the same direction.” – “And how did you 
verify them?” – “Having once spotted my man, it was easy to get corrobora-
tion. I knew the firm for which this man worked. Having taken the printed 
description, I eliminated everything from it which could be the result of a 
disguise — the whiskers, the glasses, the voice, and I sent it to the firm, with 
a request that they would inform me whether it answered to the description of 
any of their travellers. I had already noticed the peculiarities of the type-
writer, and I wrote to the man himself at his business address asking him if he 
would come here. As I expected, his reply was typewritten and revealed the 
same trivial but characteristic defects. The same post brought me a letter 
from Westhouse & Marbank, of Fenchurch Street, to say that the description 
tallied in every respect with that of their employee, James Windibank. Voilà 
tout!”’ The verification can only be indirect, as understanding the concept of 
being in disguise it is not necessary to know anything about family relations, 
typewriters or wine merchants of Fenchurch Street.  
Be that as it may, the difficulties surrounding the general case need not 
deter Dummett in the proof-theoretic justification of deduction. Restricted to 
the special case of the logical constants, the distinction between direct and 
indirect verification seems reasonably clear: ‘the introduction rules for a logi-
cal constant c represent the direct or canonical means of establishing the truth 
of a sentence with principal operator c’ [LBM p. 252]; verifications proceed-
ing otherwise are indirect. The fundamental assumption now is that ‘if we 
have a valid argument for a complex statement, we can construct a valid ar-
gument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction 
rules governing its principal operator’ [LBM p. 254]. Employing the distinc-
tion between direct and indirect verifications as applied to logical constants, 
it says that for every indirect verification of a sentence !AB we can find a di-
rect one. Accordingly, Dummett presents the fundamental assumption as a 
requirement following from the thesis that the introduction rules for a logical 
constant define its meaning. 
Another motivation for making the fundamental assumption is a rela-
tion between it, compositionality and the complexity condition. ‘The minimal 
demand we should make on an introduction rule intended to be self-justifying 
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is that its form be such as to guarantee that, in any application of it, the con-
clusion will be of higher logical complexity than any of the premises and 
than any discharged hypothesis’ [LBM p. 258]. The complexity condition en-
sures that the compositionality of the logic-free fragment of the language is 
kept intact after adding the logical constants. Thus, given an argument for A, 
by the fundamental assumption there always is an argument for A that pro-
ceeds according to its composition in a trivial, meaning-theoretically uninter-
esting sense––meaning no more than that it proceeds according to the way A 
is composed from its sub-sentential expressions. But this does not exclude 
that sentences are invoked in the argument that are of larger complexity than 
A –– the fundamental assumption alone does not exclude introduction rules 
from having premises more complex than the conclusion. However, if the 
rules governing the logical constants satisfy the complexity condition, there 
is a verification that proceeds according to its composition in a substantial 
sense: this argument for A does not invoke sentences of higher complexity 
than A in any of its subarguments. 
I need to dispose of a possible misunderstanding. It might be objected that 
the fundamental assumption is ridiculous, if it is an assumption about the form 
of deductions, as it would then entail that if " #– A $ B, then " #– A or " #– B. For 
if there is a deduction of A $ B from ", then, by the fundamental assumption, 
there is a deduction of A $ B from " which ends with a step by disjunction in-
troduction. This rule has two forms: ‘from A to infer A $ B’ and ‘from B to 
infer A $ B’. Hence by removing the last step from the deduction, either a de-
duction of A or a deduction of B from " could be constructed. But this cannot 
be correct. For there is a deduction of A $ B from A $ B, and there should be 
neither a deduction of A from A $ B nor one of B from A $ B. So the funda-
mental assumption is absurd. The misunderstanding is that the fundamental 
assumption is not applied to deductions, but to supplementations of arguments 
which are ‘the result of replacing any complex initial premise by a canonical 
(sub)argument having that premise as its final conclusion’ [LBM p. 255]. Here 
‘argument’ is a notion slightly more general than ‘deduction’ as ordinarily 
used. The details need not concern us here, but arguments may contain steps 
by ‘boundary rules’ which allow the derivation of atomic sentences from other 
atomic sentences [LBM pp. 254f]. It is worth noting at this point, though, that 
two versions of the fundamental assumption can be extracted from Dummett’s 
writings. Initially Dummett introduces the version given a few paragraphs 
earlier. Soon afterwards, however, he writes that ‘the fundamental assump-
tion is that, whenever we are entitled to assert a complex statement, we could 
have arrived at it by means of an argument terminating with at least one of 
the introduction rules governing its principal operator’ [LBM p. 257], which 
seems to restrict it to arguments with premises we know to be true. Employ-
ing this second version of the fundamental assumption, what counts as an 
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‘argument’ has to be compared to #– A rather than to " #– A. Although this 
may just be a slip of the pen, I shall suggest at the end of this paper that it is 
best to apply the fundamental assumption only to proofs of theorems, rather 
than deductions in general. 
When correctly applied, the fundamental assumption does not lead to 
logical absurdities. There are, however, other, substantial reasons against 
making it, as I shall show in the next section. 
 
 
III. FOUR OBJECTIONS TO THE FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION 
 
1. As the fundamental assumption favours introduction rules as giving 
the meanings of logical constants, applied to the case of disjunction this in-
troduces a genuinely anti-realist thought: that a disjunction can only be as-
serted if we could also assert one of its disjuncts. This should be an 
illegitimate move if the aim is to establish which logic is the correct one in-
dependently of any prior postulations in favour of realism or anti-realism. 
Dummett concedes that for some constants it is more natural to view their 
meanings as determined by their elimination rules –– arguably, disjunction is 
one of them. So the neutral approach is to reserve judgement as long as pos-
sible regarding the question whether it is the introduction or the elimination 
rules which define the meaning of a constant and to see whether neutral 
grounds can be given to decide this question. Dummett has not formulated a 
suitable converse of the fundamental assumption in case it is the elimination 
rules that determine the meanings of logical constants. Although he acknowl-
edges this to be an option, Dummett does not consider it in detail, and what 
he has to say about such an approach is much less specific than the develop-
ment of his favoured one. It is even less clear how the fundamental assump-
tion and its converse would have to be applied in case we adopt an approach 
in which the meanings of some constants are determined by their introduction 
rules and of others by their elimination rules, but again, Dummett does not 
exclude this option. 
 
2. There is a problem with the generality of the fundamental assump-
tion. The argument for why it is considered necessary if the meanings of the 
logical constants are defined by their introduction rules is the following. Sup-
pose a sentence !AB cannot be verified by the application of an introduction 
rule for !, but only by the application of an elimination rule for another logi-
cal constant %. In order to command a full understanding of ! – to be able to 
make all the uses of it one is entitled to make – the speaker has to understand 
%. Hence the meaning of !AB is not determined completely by the meanings 
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of A, B and the introduction rule for !, which accordingly does not determine 
the meaning of ! completely. 
This argument is cogent if A and B are atomic sentences. It also gener-
alises to complex A and B if % does not occur in them. It is not plausible, 
however, that it generalises any further than that. If % occurs in !AB, then a 
specification of the meaning of !AB appeals to a specification of the meaning 
of % and understanding !AB requires an understanding of %. But then a verifi-
cation of !AB ending with an application of an elimination rule for % would 
only employ the conceptual resources already required for understanding 
!AB. Understanding a logical constant is a general capacity. So if I under-
stand a logical constant, I can be expected to apply the rules governing it in 
all cases where I also understand all the other expressions occurring in the 
sentences it connects. Thus the partial ordering dependence of meaning im-
poses on the language would not be endangered, if, by hypothesis, I understand 
all the subsentential expressions of !AB, even if its canonical verification ended 
with an application of an elimination rule for %. If this correct, then the funda-
mental assumption is badly motivated because it is too general. 
 
3. The fundamental assumption is only as clear as is the distinction be-
tween direct and indirect verifications. At first glance, in contrast to its appli-
cation to other expressions of the language, the distinction seems admirably 
clear when applied to the logical constants. But Dummett concedes that we 
are sometimes justified in asserting A $ B without having any means of re-
trieving which of A or B is assertible. Dummett gives two examples. We may 
be able to infer ‘That is either a boy or a girl over there’ from ‘That is a child 
over there’, where ‘the disjunctive conclusion was not arrived at by “or”-
introduction, and may well not have been able to be on the basis of the obser-
vation actually made. […] Hardy may simply not have been able to hear 
whether Nelson said, “Kismet, Hardy” or “Kiss me, Hardy”, though he heard 
him say one or the other: once we have the concept of disjunction, our percep-
tions themselves may assume an irremediably disjunctive form’ [LBM p. 267]. 
Thus, not only does Dummett concede that we may derive disjunctive sen-
tences without applying disjunction introduction, he goes as far as to ac-
knowledge that it is possible to verify a disjunction directly without verifying 
either of its disjuncts. Dummett does not discuss any other logical constants 
in this context, but something analogous may plausibly be the case with ne-
gation: can’t I infer ‘This is not red’ from ‘This is green’ or perceive directly 
that the wine is not in the fridge without having to derive an absurdity from 
contrary assumptions? 
The upshot of this is that it is not the case that, for any logical constant, 
every direct verification of a sentence A&B needs to end with the application 
of an introduction rule for &. This makes the distinction between direct and 
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indirect verifications problematic even in the special case of the logical con-
stants, and obviously this undermines the fundamental assumption: if it is not 
the case that only those verifications of a complex sentence count as direct 
which end with an application of an introduction rule for its principal connec-
tive, then the fundamental assumption is false. 
Dummett’s response to this problem is to claim that we are not con-
cerned with actual verifications, but only with potential ones by a suitably 
placed observer. This response leads to my next objection to the fundamental 
assumption.  
 
4. According to Dummett, the fundamental assumption needs to be in-
terpreted in a suitable way. He concedes that ‘what underpin the fundamental 
assumption are considerations that are not themselves proof-theoretic but are 
in a broad sense semantic: we are driven to invoke some notion of truth’ 
[LBM p. 269]. Thus the fundamental assumption leads away from a purely 
proof-theoretic justification of deduction, which is not a bad thing, as it is 
implausible that no notion of truth enters it at all. Dummett needs to ensure 
that even if we are not actually in a position to proceed according to the fun-
damental assumption, an argument with a complex conclusion may nonethe-
less be valid. So the fundamental assumption needs to be interpreted in a 
suitable way: every complex sentence could have been verified by an appli-
cation of an introduction rule for its principal connective by a suitably placed 
observer, who then could have produced a canonical argument for the sen-
tence in question, even though we are not actually in a position to do so. In 
general, such an observer need not only be suitably placed, but also endowed 
with suitable powers, as such an observer would have to be able to, for in-
stance, decide whether a very large number is either odd or even, so as to be 
able to produce a canonical argument for the statement that it is. Let’s call such 
an observer ‘ideal’. Then, if an argument is valid, an ideal observer could have 
produced a canonical argument for its conclusion.  
A realist, who accepts classical logic, would have to hold that an ideal 
observer can verify every proposition or its negation. But according to Dummett, 
this cannot be justified merely by appeal to the powers of an ideal ob-
server. The laws validated by the proof-theoretic justification of deduction 
‘remain invariant under considerable variation in the interpretation of the 
fundamental assumption, because it will still serve to validate them by the 
proof-theoretic justification procedure, without the need for further assump-
tions. When the strong realist interpretation is adopted, however, the situation 
changes: not all laws can any longer be validated by proof-theoretic means, 
because their validity depends not only on the fundamental assumption but 
on the further assumption of bivalence’ [LBM p. 271]. Whether a proposition 
can be verified does not depend on anyone’s capacities, but only on the 
proposition and what it is about. Take Dummett’s example of Jones, who’s 
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dead now and has never been in a situation where he could have shown brav-
ery. If we don’t assume bivalence, we have no reason to assume that even the 
ideal observer will come up with an answer to the question whether Jones 
was brave. If Jones’ actions leave that question open, we have no reason to 
believe that ‘Jones is brave’ is determinately either true or false, unless we 
assume the principle of bivalence. Similarly for Goldbach’s Conjecture, for 
instance. Unless we accept bivalence, why should we exclude the option that 
mathematical reality leaves it undetermined whether every even number is 
the sum of two primes? Thus, even if we introduce the notion of an ideal ob-
server to give a suitable interpretation of the fundamental assumption, ac-
cording to Dummett the proof-theoretic justification of deduction still does 
not validate classical logic.  
This line of argument, however, is dependent on what capacities we al-
low the ideal observer to have. Classicists and intuitionists agree that there 
are only two truth values, i.e. true or false. They disagree over whether every 
proposition determinately is one of the two. We can follow Dummett and ex-
clude the option of there being more than two truth values as of relatively 
minor significance: ‘A meaning-theory which substitutes, for the two-valued 
semantics, a finitely many-valued one represents a very trivial variation of 
this: we have merely been provided with a slightly more complicated mecha-
nism for determining the truth or otherwise of a complex sentence in accor-
dance with its composition from the subsentences. In such a semantic theory, 
truth, as we have been using this notion, corresponds to having a designated 
value’ [LBM p. 305]. The difference between realists and anti-realists relies 
on there being propositions to which we are in no position to attach a truth 
value. For the anti-realist, the world is underdetermined: there are, in a sense, 
gaps in reality. But we are in no position to recognize any gaps: to assume 
that we can implies a contradiction, because we would then be in a position 
to recognise that it can never be verified and never be falsified, in which case 
it would be neither true nor false, which is impossible. All we can do is note 
that, as things stand, certain propositions have as yet neither been verified nor 
falsified. We cannot exclude the possibility that we will be in a position to 
decide these propositions. The question now arises what the ideal observer is 
able to do with a proposition to which we cannot attach a truth value. Assuming 
that no proposition can be neither true nor false, he wouldn’t be able to recog-
nise a gap in reality either. But why should we go for the option that the ideal 
observer is in the same position that we are in? In the case of Goldbach’s 
Conjecture, why can’t we allow the ideal observer to be able to complete the 
infinite task of checking each even number whether it is the sum of two 
primes? In the Jones case, why can’t we allow the ideal observer to have sci-
entia media or sufficient powers of counterfactual reasoning to be able to de-
termine what Jones would have done had he been in a situation where he 
could have acted bravely? A realist may not have a problem with attributing 
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such powers to the ideal observer; the anti-realist obviously would. But how 
are we to decide the question which position to take? It seems as if each posi-
tion favours an account of the powers of the ideal observer suitable to its 
metaphysics. Put slightly differently, both the realist and the anti-realist agree 
that what the ideal observer could have verified extends our own recogni-
tional capacities ad infinitum. But they disagree over what this means. The 
anti-realist insists we restrict ourselves to the potential infinite: the ideal ob-
server’s capacities extend our actual capacities in an arbitrarily large finite 
way, so that even the ideal observer cannot complete infinite tasks. The real-
ist insists that we can allow the extension of our capacities by an actually in-
finite amount, so that the ideal observer can complete infinite tasks. The anti-
realist will say that we cannot conceive of an actual infinite, the realist will say 
that we can. But the proof-theoretic justification of logical laws is not the place 
to decide that question, and so introducing the ideal observer doesn’t help. 
It is worth noting that in a later book, Dummett entertains the possibil-
ity that intuitionist logic is, as it were, the logic of our limitations: ‘we cannot 
consistently envisage there being any such gap in a particular case; this 
would be to envisage a proposition’s being neither true nor false, and this 
would be a contradictory supposition. […] God can know where a gap in re-
ality occurs, by knowing neither the truth nor the falsity of some proposition; 
he has available to him a negation which is not available to us. It might there-
fore be urged that the logic of God’s thought, a logic to whose application we 
cannot attain, is a three-valued, rather than a classical, one’ [Dummett 
(2004), p.96]. Thus, if we allow the ideal observer to have the powers of veri-
fication Dummett here attributes to God, and we stick to the assumption that 
no proposition is neither true nor false, it follows that every proposition is ei-
ther true or false. It is not so much the principle of bivalence that is at issue, 
rather, it is the principle both classicists and intuitionists agree on, that no 
sentence can be neither true nor false, plus which capacities of surveying 
what can be verified we can attribute to the ideal observer.  
The appeal to an ideal observer in order to interpret the fundamental as-
sumption, then, is problematic. Realists and anti-realists will assume the ideal 
observer to have capacities suitable to their respective notions of truth, i.e. 
metaphysics. We have not been given any criteria for deciding which notion 
of an ideal observer is the correct one. Evoking the ideal observer in the in-
terpretation of the fundamental assumption results in placing metaphysical and 
epistemological issues at the foundations of the proof-theoretic justification of 
deduction, which, as the aim is to provide a logical basis for metaphysics, is 
detrimental to the project. The fact that the fundamental assumption stands in 
need of interpretation, and the kind of interpretation required according to 
Dummett, makes it counterproductive, given the larger aim of Dummett’s 
project. 
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IV. DO WE NEED THE FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION? 
 
Thus, as the fundamental assumption favours introduction rules, it in-
troduces anti-realist prejudices; it is too general to be plausible; Dummett 
himself admits that it is possible to know that a disjunction is true without be-
ing in a position to verify either disjunct; and the appeal to an ideal observer 
to remedy the last point is not workable as classical and intuitionist logicians 
won’t agree on the capacity of such an observer. On the one hand, Dummett 
considers the fundamental assumption to be a prerequisite of the proof-
theoretic justification of deduction, and he gives an initial definition of the 
notion of valid canonical argument on the basis of it [LBM pp. 259ff]. On the 
other hand, Dummett admits that the fundamental assumption points away 
from a purely proof-theoretic justification of deduction, and he is forced to 
relax the requirements of his definition of validity, as the fundamental as-
sumption is strictly speaking false when applied to some constants [LBM pp. 
265ff]. Hence it is worth asking if the proof-theoretic justification of deduc-
tion can do without the fundamental assumption. In fact, the fundamental as-
sumption has not attracted much attention in the literature, which suggests 
that the interest of the proof-theoretic justification of deduction is independ-
ent of it. I think this is so for the following reasons.  
The proof-theoretic justification of deduction consists of a formal pro-
ject with a philosophical motivation. The formal project is to establish the 
normalisation of deductions: it is a requirement on a proof-theoretically justi-
fied logic that its deductions normalise. But normalisation proofs are inde-
pendent of the fundamental assumption, because it does not introduce any 
new formal concepts and does not impose any restrictions on the forms of 
rules of inference. Although Prawitz thinks that the fundamental assumption 
is important philosophically, there is no formal equivalent of it in his work on 
normalization of proofs [Prawitz (1965)] and the fundamental assumption is 
not appealed to there. The philosophical motivation of normalisability is the 
demand that the rules of inference governing the logical constants be in har-
mony, i.e. that the grounds for asserting a proposition are in harmony with 
the consequences of accepting it. This requirement has the effect of excluding 
connectives like Prior’s tonk, but is of more general importance. The motiva-
tion for demanding that deductions normalise and that detours through 
maximal formulas may be removed is the thought that applying logic to 
premises to derive conclusions should not result in more information than we 
already had, and all information contained in the premises should remain ex-
tractable from the conclusions drawn. As Dummett puts it, ‘the requirement 
that this criterion for harmony be satisfied conforms to our fundamental con-
ception of what deductive inference accomplishes. An argument or proof 
convinces us because we construe it as showing that, given the premises hold 
good according to our ordinary criteria, the conclusion must also hold ac-
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cording to the criteria we already have for its holding’ [LBM p. 219]. This 
view of the nature of deduction is again independent of the fundamental as-
sumption. Harmony is a feature of rules of inference. The requirement of 
harmony imposes restrictions on the form of rules of inference: the introduc-
tion and elimination rules for a logical constant must match in such a way 
that the grounds for asserting a proposition by application of an introduction 
rule match the consequences that can be drawn from the proposition by an 
application of an elimination rule. Harmony between introduction and elimi-
nation rules is the basis of normalization of proofs, as harmony between in-
troduction and elimination rules is shown to hold by establishing that there 
are procedures for removing maximal formulas from deductions. Thus this 
aspect of the proof-theoretic justification of deduction is independent of the 
fundamental assumption.  
Contrast the fundamental assumption with the complexity condition. 
The complexity condition is the formal equivalent of compositionality and 
imposes restrictions on the forms of rules of inference. Although the rules for 
classical negation seem to exhibit a somewhat different shape from the intu-
itionist ones, that does not change the fact that classical logic normalises, if 
suitably formalised. To exclude classical logic from being a justified logic, 
some other considerations are needed. This can be achieved by appealing to 
compositionality. By compositionality, the meaning of '' A is dependent on 
the meaning of A and negation. It may happen that a sentence of a language 
where double negation elimination is employed can be verified only via its 
double negation. In such a case the move from '' A to A would contribute to 
the meaning of A, because it licenses uses of A not otherwise possible, as ex 
hypothesi no other verification is available. Hence the meaning of A would 
depend on the meaning of '' A. This is a circular dependence of meaning 
and hence, Dummett would claim, A cannot have a stable meaning at all. A 
speaker could not break into the circle and learn the meaning of A, which 
could have no place in the partial ordering that dependence of meaning im-
poses on the language. Of course, classical logic can be formulated with rules 
other than double negation elimination. But any such formulation will violate 
either the complexity condition or the restriction motivated by compositional-
ity that there should be no circular dependence of meaning amongst the logi-
cal constants. Besides, it will remain the case that the verification of A will 
somehow make use of ' A, hence the meaning of A depends on the meaning 
of ' A, which in turn depends on the meaning of ' and A, so that the circular 
dependence of meaning has not been avoided. For the argument to go 
through it is sufficient that double negation elimination is assumed to be 
valid, no matter whether it is a derived or primitive rule of inference. Again, 
the fundamental assumption has not been appealed to. Compositionality suf-
fices. So the major result of the proof-theoretic justification of deduction, that 
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only intuitionist, but not classical logic, turns out to be justified can be estab-
lished without appeal to the fundamental assumption.1  
 
 
V. TOWARDS A LOGICAL BASIS OF METAPHYSICS WITHOUT THE 
FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION 
 
According to Dummett, objections 3 and 4 arise when the fundamental 
assumption is applied to arguments in ordinary discourse for empirical 
propositions. The problems do not arise if applied to purely logical reasoning, 
i.e. proofs of theorems, because in this case it can be proved that something 
that looks very much like the fundamental assumption holds for suitably for-
mulated systems: #– A&B if and only if there is a proof of A&B that ends with 
an application of an introduction rule for &. This holds, for instance, for the 
systems of intuitionist and classical logic in [Prawitz (1965)]. Furthermore, 
this proof will only use rules of inference for connectives contained in A&B, 
so that objection 2 cannot arise either. Of course, this is not the fundamental 
assumption, as it is not an assumption at all. Rather, it is a consequence of a 
suitably formulated logic.  
It is also possible to formulate a converse of the fundamental assump-
tion in case it is the elimination rules that specify the meanings of the logical 
constants. In that case, we should be interested in showing whether some-
thing is a contradiction, i.e. not in the case where something follows from the 
empty set, #– A, but rather in the case where the empty set follows from some-
thing, A #– , or rather A #– (, as this is what corresponds in a calculus of natural 
deduction to the A #– of a sequent calculus. We can call such a construction a 
refutation of a contradiction. In a suitably formulated system of classical or in-
tuitionist logic, it can be proved that A #– ( if and only if there is a proof in 
which begins with an application of an elimination rule to A.  
Dummett thinks that it is necessary to make the fundamental assump-
tion and apply it to arguments in general, not just proofs, as it is arguments 
for empirical propositions that we are normally engaged in in everyday rea-
soning. Dummett is concerned about the actual use speakers make of expres-
sions, including the logical ones. Intuitionist implication and disjunction, for 
instance, do not accord well with the use of ‘or’ and ‘if then’ in ordinary dis-
course. We don’t assert ‘If A then B’ just in case we are in possession of an 
argument that shows how an argument for B may be constructed from an ar-
gument for A, as reflection on, e.g., Dummett’s own example ‘If you enter 
this room, you’ll die before nightfall’ shows. Similarly we don’t just assert ‘A 
or B’ if we are in possession of a way of finding either an argument for A or 
one for B. To match the use of English ‘or’ and ‘if then’ with the use of intu-
itionist $ and ), the fundamental assumption needs to be interpreted in the 
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way that gives rise to objections 3 and 4. It is, however, plausible that this con-
cern with the use of ‘or’ and ‘if then’ in ordinary discourse is not well moti-
vated. It may of course be an interesting question in how far the meanings of 
the logical constants of a system of natural deduction reflect the meanings of 
‘or’, ‘all’, ‘if-then’ in natural language. But it is plausible that we do not need 
to take these complications into account: if the thesis is that the meanings of the 
logical constants are completely specified by the rules of inference governing 
them, then they may be given from scratch by those rules of inference. The 
logical constants of formal systems do not need to match up with any expres-
sions of natural language at all. If the meanings of the logical symbols are 
given by their rules of inference, we do not need to look at ordinary discourse 
for a specification of their meaning and use: the rules are enough. 
The complications with the fundamental assumption arise from taking 
into account arguments for empirical propositions. But metaphysics is not an 
empirical subject and it is not one that needs to be tied to everyday, ordinary 
reasoning. Of course, it would be desirable if metaphysics accords with untu-
tored intuitions. But Dummett is a revisionist. He countenances the possibil-
ity that metaphysics will go against initial intuitions. Despite his revisionism, 
metaphysics should accord with untutored intuition, where there is no other 
basis for explaining what the terms of the metaphysician mean. For instance, 
if the metaphysician uses primitive terms in his theory that cannot be defined 
and have no analogue in ordinary language, the charge that we cannot under-
stand him seems justified. But this problem cannot possibly arise in the case 
of a logical basis of metaphysics: the primitives, i.e. the logical constants, are 
defined entirely in terms of rules of inference. To provide a logical basis for 
metaphysics, it should suffice to account for purely logical reasoning: the 
complications arising from non-empirical reasoning are irrelevant to the pro-
ject. The aim is achieved by the demand for harmony between introduction 
and elimination rules, normalisation of proofs and the complexity condition 
on rules of inference. Indeed, the metaphysical conclusion Dummett derives 
from his account of the justification of deduction is based on, not that certain 
inferences derived from some premises are invalid, but that A $ ' A is not a 
theorem of intuitionist logic: anti-realism corresponds to the failure of that 
proposition being a theorem.  
This is not to suggest that all there is to metaphysics is what we can 
read off the justified logic. If a system of metaphysics were formalised, it 
would presumably contain axioms of an extra-logical character. Whether the 
formal results that hold for the logic still hold for the whole system cannot be 
decided without actually having that system, except that any metaphysical 
axioms would have to be conservative over the logic. But as the proof-
theoretic justification of deduction only gives the logical basis of metaphys-
ics, the broad outline within which metaphysics is to be pursued, the latter 
requirement suffices to ensure the metaphysics is still anti-realist.  
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If we restrict consideration to purely logical reasoning, the content of 
the fundamental assumption reappears as something which is neither funda-
mental nor an assumption, but a theorem about the form of normalised proofs 
in systems of natural deduction. It is provable that in the case of both, classi-
cal and intuitionist logic as formulated by Prawitz, for any theorem, there is a 
proof of it which ends with an application of an introduction rule for its main 
connective. So instead of demanding that the fundamental assumption hold 
for any kind of argument, restricting consideration to purely logical reasoning 
we can observe that every theorem has a direct verification proceeding in ac-
cordance with its composition. This is a result that is formally tractable, as 
opposed to what Dummett originally had in mind. It is a consequence of the 
proof-theoretic justification of deduction rather than a precondition for it. But 
it is plausible that it is all we need if we are interested in a logical basis of 
metaphysics: for then we only need to take into account purely logical rea-
soning, and so all we need to take into account are proofs not Dummett’s 
wider notion of an argument and its supplementation.2 
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1 In [Kürbis (n.d.)] I consider possible responses to this argument on behalf of 
the classicist and the costs at which they come to the proof-theoretic justification of 
deduction.  
2 I would like to thank the two referees for teorema, whose constructive criti-
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